NOTE: This cover is to be used only for official files and should be forwarded with Australian Archives.
Form Number AR 111 is to be used.

SUBJECT: EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folio</th>
<th>Referred to</th>
<th>Date Referred</th>
<th>Actioned by (Init)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>5/11/00</td>
<td>26/11/00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/12</td>
<td>X0</td>
<td>30/12/00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>10/10/00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5/11/00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/11/00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>WAT TKG</td>
<td>5/11/00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARCHIVAL ACTION

Close /Red

Stock No 7530-66-093-3093
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE FILING OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE HANDLING OF FILES ARE CONTAINED IN DEPARTMENTAL AND SINGLE SERVICE MANUALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Number</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred To</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>4 Jan 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRADDLE</td>
<td>26 June 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>9 July 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>1 Oct 83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FILE LOCATION CARD**

Department of Defence
AR 40-1 (Blue) (Rev 1975)
Stock No: 7530-66-096-4988

When Complete Use Other Side
Rule out last column on front of card before commencing entries on this side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referred To</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Referred To</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Referred To</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Reference A requested details of equipment/manpower resources committed and manpower overtime hours accrued during Operation Close Encounter. Reference B advised overtime hours accrued.

2. During the exercise, the following shifts were worked by officers:

   a. 1 July 83 0500 - 1500 6 pilots + 1 deck officer (3hrs overtime)

   b. 1/2 July 83 1500 - 0100 1 pilot for 3 hrs (77.5hr remainder)

   c. 2 July 83 0100 - 1000 6 pilots + 1 deck 0, and

   d. 2/3 July 83 1600 - 0200

3. Ground crew worked similar shifts with an additional shift on Sunday and 0500 start on Sunday. Each shift consisted of 1 x Engo and 12 airmen.

4. During each shift, two aircraft were on alert with two more aircraft on standby do relieve at shift changeover.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HQWLM</th>
<th>ACT IN</th>
<th>ACT TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>HQWLM</th>
<th>ACT INF NFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>481SQN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77SQN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 CU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FLT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CRU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265GN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJWE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>669GL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Memorandum

From: 322

To: HOME

For Information

Subject: Operation Close Encounters

Date: 25 July 1983

1. Please find attached an account of 322's decisive efforts in the recent UFO hunt, commonly known as "Operation Close Encounters."

2. This report was originally raised at unit level in the belief that someone, somewhere, someday would ask for it. Thus, although it is not in direct response to your request as a result of Reference A, it should contain the information sought among a host of other exciting revelations.

3. Perhaps the only additional information necessary is that each shift involved about twenty persons, all ranks. Naturally the entire hardware and software resources of 322 were devoted to the task.

Enclosure: 322/83/59/141 () Operation Close Encounters

K. A. Keenan

Squad X0 61/58
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>ACTION TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>HQWLML</th>
<th>ACT/VNFO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQWLML</td>
<td>REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLML)</td>
<td>OC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSWLM</td>
<td></td>
<td>ADMINSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4615GN</td>
<td></td>
<td>XO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>775GN</td>
<td></td>
<td>PQSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 CU</td>
<td></td>
<td>STANDO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FLT</td>
<td></td>
<td>EFSO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3CRU</td>
<td></td>
<td>INTEL0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265GN</td>
<td></td>
<td>ORWOPF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJWE</td>
<td></td>
<td>WOD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66GL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

- Other inputs?
- Bow file
OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

Reference: A. HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects.

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Base Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.
7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed. Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occasional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Gordon, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

   a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,
b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and

c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. PLOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interference colloquially known as 'running rabbits' and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,

b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,

c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and

d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A picture was then drawn from a position as close
to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possible. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as members were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flight personnel applied themselves to the task
with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,

b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the observed objects,

c. seeking advice and assistance from better qualified or more experienced personnel
when available, and

d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and

e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.

14 Jul 83

(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

ANNEXES:

A. Record and Plot of UFO contacts by AACC Sydney from 302035Z JUN 83 to 012359Z JUL 83
B. Record and Plot from 020001Z to 022359Z JUL 83
C. Record and Plot from 030001Z to 032359Z JUL 83
D. Chronological record of UFO contacts throughout Operation Close Encounters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/RANGE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPEED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>302035</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(005SYD125)</td>
<td>050</td>
<td>FAST(1)</td>
<td>Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355M150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010322</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>275SYD105</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0340</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>340SYD130</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0515</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(079SYD127)</td>
<td>070</td>
<td>SLOW</td>
<td>Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc from FL240.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115NLM120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0605</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>335SYD155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0733</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005SYD155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0742</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005SYD22</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0936</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(019SYD78)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Held barely by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>090WLM10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1028</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(357SYD37)</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>M.2</td>
<td>60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>350NLM25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>050SYD120</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1446</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(005SYD138)</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355NLM65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>010SYD98</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2214</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>360SYD110</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Faded 350SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2216</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>360SYD138</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216:20</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003SYD145</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216:30</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003SYD158</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005SYD163 and faded at 005SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2221</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>012SYD165</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2325</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003SYD153</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (Z)</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/SYD/RGE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPEED</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0230</td>
<td>SECTOR 8</td>
<td>005/100</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0320</td>
<td>SECTOR 8</td>
<td>336/124</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>360/120</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16 sweeps at sector 7: when plotted by 3CRU on paper, HDG, and SPD works out at 040 1050 knots (± 200). Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437½</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>005/135</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0439</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>008/150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0608</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>005/137</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13 sweeps at sect 7. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0609</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>008/158</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>003/90</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 good paints. Not seen 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0636</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>005/112</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 paint only. (possibly related to previous contact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>004/154</td>
<td>060</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2240</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>357/37</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Held as firm contact by SYD for 20+ Nmiles. Not seen by 3CRU or WLM SURAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2241</td>
<td>SECTOR 7</td>
<td>355/62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME(2)</td>
<td>REPORTED BY</td>
<td>BRG/SYD/RAE</td>
<td>HDG</td>
<td>SPEED</td>
<td>HT</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0321</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>350/140</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contact for 6 sweeps (approx 12 miles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0643</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>350/135</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>No SPD/HT given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0703</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>352/148</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>No SPD/HT given. 3 sweeps only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0953</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>356/125</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>Believed by SYD to be interference, heavy weather in area. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0953</td>
<td>WLM APP</td>
<td>011/112</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>M1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Held briefly by WLM SUR. D. Plots about 15 miles SE of SYD contact at same time. Heavy WX. 3 paints only. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3CRU</td>
<td>352/102</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>Classified aircraft which fled on to SYD. Lines up with SYD 0953 report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1411</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>010/115</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Held until faded over WLM at 1425. Not seen by 3CRU. Heavy weather in area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2310</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>010/140</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Held 2 - 3 sweeps by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU. Not seen SURAD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
'Cease Tell' occurred from 2310 at start of conference with DOA technicians at Mascot.
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

30 JUN 83
01 JUL 83
02 JUL 83
03 JUL 83

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
LOCAL
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS OF HQWL M AND HQAMB PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER RESOURCES COMMITTED AND THE MANPOWER OVERTIME HOURS ACCRUED IN MEETING THIS TASK

BT

1/26/83

Yully has been sent and this is probably second one of action signal.

RP
MEMORANDUM

From: BSWLM
To: HQWLM
Attention: STANDO

Date: 28 JUL 83

File: 17/2/AR (16)

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

The following BSWLM details are provided in response to REF A:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Equipment/Manpower</th>
<th>Hours Accrued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Manpower - Radelng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commsop</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Manpower (Warehouse and Fuel Farm)</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment (Sweeper)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Manpower - Nurses</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total BSWLM Manhous Accrued: 1334

Signature: B. Vitnell

Name: B. VITNEEL
Rank: FltLt
Appointment: Admini
Phone No: 6171

Security Classification: Restricted
**MESSAGE FORM**

**NOTE:** Shaded areas are for COMMENC/SIGN use only.

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

**MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS**

**SIG/ORIG NO**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**SYSTEM**

**OPERATOR**

**OPERATION**

**CLOSE ENCOUNTER**

**EMI O&G COFS OF 250602 JUL 98**

**IN RESPONSE TO REF A**

**THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER</th>
<th>MOVES ARRIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>MANPOWER</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELECOMMUNICATIONS</td>
<td>MANPOWER - BARTCH</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- COMMSP</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT - WEAPONS</td>
<td>MANPOWER</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- FUEL FARM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>MANPOWER</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EQUIPMENT (SWEETER)</td>
<td>-16-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATERING</td>
<td>MANPOWER</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>-105 HOURS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL</td>
<td>MANPOWER - M.O.</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUR</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE</td>
<td>MANPOWER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EQUIPMENT (CRASH)</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRASH BRAK ON STANDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MAN MOVES FOR UNIT</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AIRCRAFT**

| 2 OCU |

**INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF**

**ENGINEERING OFFICERS**

**TECHNICAL AIRMEN**

**175**

**43**

**540**

**RESTRICTED**

**PAGE NO**

**1**

**DRAFTER’S NAME AND TITLE**

**PHONE NO**

**REF FILE NO**

**NO OF PAGES**

**3**

**RELEASEER’S NAME AND TITLE**

**SIGNATURE**

**DATE**

Stock No 7530-66-094-6819
**MESSAGE FORM**

**NOTE:** Shaded areas are for **COMM Commercial** security classification and special handling instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE 1</th>
<th>LINE 2</th>
<th>LINE 3</th>
<th>LINE 4</th>
<th>LINE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRECEDENCE – ACTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>PRECEDENCE – INFO ROUTINE</strong></td>
<td><strong>DATE – TIME GROUP</strong></td>
<td><strong>MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>SIG/ ORG NO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROUTINE INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> Write only one addressee per line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO</strong></td>
<td><strong>EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 x MIR 3 on alert</strong></td>
<td><strong>NIL FLYING</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL FOR UNIT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>756 HRS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>C 77 SON</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aircrew only</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>204 HRS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>D 441 SON</strong></td>
<td><strong>SECTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MANHOURS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MMSIS and strip clearance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>GSES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL FOR UNIT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>510 HRS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>E HWLY SAR uLT</strong></td>
<td><strong>MANPOWER</strong></td>
<td><strong>TECHNICAL AIRCREW</strong></td>
<td><strong>130 HRS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>EQUIPMENT 1 Unit on standby NIL FLYING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL FOR UNIT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>260 HRS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>F 3 CRV</strong></td>
<td><strong>MANPOWER – MAINTENANCE</strong></td>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>OPERATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>900</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PAGE NO** 2  **DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**  **PHONE NO**  **REF FILE NO**

**NO OF PAGES** 3  **RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE**  **SIGNATURE**  **DATE**

**FOR OPS USE**  **R**  **DATE**  **TIME**  **SYSTEM**  **OPERATOR**  **D**  **DATE**  **TIME**  **SYSTEM**  **OPERATOR**  **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**  **RESTPD**
EQUIPMENT

SERVICE TRANSFER TO AND FROM MASCOT APPROX 1800 KM
ONE CIJO DIVERTED TO MASCOT TO DROP PAY
NINE MAN DAYS OF INCIDENTAL ALLOWANCE

TOTAL FOR UNIT 1596 HRS

TOTAL MAN HOURS FOR FORMATION 5316 EQUALS 22.5 MAN DAYS
OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

Reference: HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects.

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Bae Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.
7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed. Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occasional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Garden, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

   a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,
b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and

c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. FLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interface colloquially known as 'running rabbits and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,

b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,

c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and

d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A picture was drawn from a position as close
to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possible. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as member were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLG OFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flt's personnel applied themselves to the task
with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. JCRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

   a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,

   b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the observed objects,

   c. seeking advice and assistance from better qualified or more experienced personnel
when available, and

d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and

e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.

(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

20 Jul 83
## UFO Reports by AACC Sydney from 302035 Jun 83 to 012359 Jul 83

### Table of Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Reported By</th>
<th>BRG/RANGE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>302035</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(005/SYD125)</td>
<td>050</td>
<td>FAST(1)</td>
<td>Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355WLM50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010322</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>275/SYD105</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0340</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>340/SYD130</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0515</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(079/SYD127)</td>
<td>070</td>
<td>SLOW</td>
<td>Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc. From FL240.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115WLM120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0605</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>335/SYD155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0733</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005/SYD155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0742</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005/SYD72</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0936</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(019/SYD73)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Query by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>090WLM10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1028</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(357/SYD87)</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>M1.2</td>
<td>60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300WLM25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0120</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>050/SYD120</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0121</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>050/SYD135</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1446</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>(005/SYD138)</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355WLM65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>010/SYD98</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2214</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>360/SYD110</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Faded 350/SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2216</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>360/SYD138</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0216:20</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003/SYD145</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0216:30</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003/SYD155</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V.FAST</td>
<td>Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005/SYD163 and faded at 005/SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2221</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>012/SYD165</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2325</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>003/SYD153</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:

1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME(Z)</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/SYD/RGE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0230</td>
<td>Sect 8</td>
<td>005/100</td>
<td>N1</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hold briefly by Syd not seen by 3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0320</td>
<td></td>
<td>336/124</td>
<td>N1</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hold briefly by Syd, NS3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437</td>
<td>Sect 07</td>
<td>360/120</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16 Sweeps at Sect 7, when plotted by 3CBU on paper, HDG and SPD works out at 040° 1050 Kts (±200) NS3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437½</td>
<td></td>
<td>005/135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13 Sweeps at Sect 7, NS3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0439</td>
<td></td>
<td>008/150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 Good Paints, NS3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0608</td>
<td></td>
<td>008/157</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Paint only (loss, related to previous contact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0609</td>
<td></td>
<td>008/158½</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hold briefly, NS3CBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630</td>
<td></td>
<td>003/190</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hold as firm contact by Syd for 20+ N Miles. NSCBU or WIM SORAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0636</td>
<td></td>
<td>005/112</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td></td>
<td>004/134</td>
<td>060</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2241</td>
<td></td>
<td>337/87</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex B**

3CBU/85/57/1A/R

DATED 10 JUL 83

UFO CONTACT REPORT at 1800 ZULU from 0230Z = 022357Z JUL 83
## UFO Sightings Reported by Air Traffic Control from 03001Z JUL 63 to 032359Z JUL 63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME(Z)</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/SYD/RAE</th>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0321</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>330/140</td>
<td>120°</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0643</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>350/135</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NO SPD/HT GIVEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0703</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>352/148</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0953</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>256/125</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>40°</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>BELIEVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERING HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. N53CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0953</td>
<td>WLM AFR</td>
<td>001/112</td>
<td>17°</td>
<td>M55/b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAM. PLOTS ABOUT 15 MILES SE OF SYD CONTACT AT SAME TIME. HEAVY IX. 5 SWEEPS ONLY. N53CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3CRU</td>
<td>252/102</td>
<td>102°</td>
<td>N20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CONSIDERED AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW OVER TO SYD. LINSE UP WITH SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1411</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>010/115</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD UNTIL PAVED OVER WLM AT 1425. N53CRU. HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2310</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>010/140</td>
<td>180°</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD N53CRU N5SURAM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** 'Cence Tell' Occurred from 2310 at Start of Conference With DON Technicians at Mascot.
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

- 30 Jun 83
- 01 Jul 83
- 02 Jul 83
- 03 Jul 83

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1000 LOCAL
HEADQUARTERS RAAF WILLIAMTOWN

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTERS'

Reference: HQOC 073/STINT SIG EAI dated 300350ZJUN83.

INTRODUCTION

1. Following receipt of Reference A, Operation 'Close Encounters' was set in train to resolve unexplained sightings of allegedly airborne, man-made objects by the staff of the Sydney AACC. The movements of these objects were said to be consistent with those of aircraft.

AIM

2. As requested by HQWLM, this report will outline, very briefly, the effects of this operation on 3CRU.

METHOD

3. 3CRU was directed at 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to begin surveillance at 0600 hours Friday 1 July 1983. The unit was organized into two shifts of 12 hours duration with sufficient technical staff on hand to provide a specialist for all types of equipment outside normal working hours and sufficient operations staff to ensure that those on surveillance would always be fresh and alert. Some equipment and administrative support was also required.

4. A report chain was established with RAAF ATC Sector 8, Mascot and UHF communications were maintained with aircraft on alert 2 in case of scrambles.

5. From the start, unit executives and controllers entertained doubts about the soundness of the theories held by DOA members. Furthermore, nothing was seen on the TPS-43 radar which correlated with DOA sightings, so a team of three Air Defence Controllers was despatched to AACC Mascot to investigate the matter in greater depth.

RESULTS

6. The investigating team proved beyond reasonable doubt by Sunday 3 July 1983 that the unidentified objects were generated entirely from interference within the processor of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR). At no time were any correlated sightings made by 3CRU, SURAD WLM or the Round Mountain Radar near Armidale.

7. All sightings were plotted along with chronological records and remarks made at the time. A more comprehensive report including all this detail is held at 3CRU and is available if required. No aircraft were scrambled.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HQWLM</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>ACTION TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>HQWLM</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>NFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQWLM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85WLM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481SQN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77SQN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 CU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FLT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CRU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265QN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJWE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666GL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL INST.
COSTS

8. Accrued overtime for this operation totalled 66% man days, being 37% days for technical staff, 23 for operations and 6 for equipment and administrative support. Officers naturally worked a considerable number of extra rostered hours and several attended voluntarily for various periods.

9. The cost of sending the three officers to Sydney is not yet fully known. A Service vehicle was used continuously for 3 days and some out of pocket meals and phone calls will have to be claimed for.

10. No 6 ADIO course was started one day late as a direct result, and scheduled maintenance fell behind by three days.

CONCLUSION

11. In spite of the alarming contents of Reference A, no corroboration of UFOs was offered by any other agency and the mystery was laid to rest quickly by an investigative team from 3CRU/114MCRU using common sense and methods that could have been applied at AACC Mascot before Reference A was raised. While 3CRU's financial costs attributable to the operation appear slight there was a much greater cost in accrued overtime for airmen, disruption of domestic and operational routines and delays in the training schedule. Fortunately there was no temptation to launch aircraft and add to the fuel bill occasioned by use of the RAAF Datsun between 3CRU, Sydney AACC and 2SD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Data linking between the various radar sensors in South Eastern Australia (upon which preliminary work has been done) should be progressed as a priority matter. Direct comparisons could then be made at any time and false alarms could be avoided by early discussion between agencies.

(K.A. KEENAN)
Squadron Leader
T/Commanding Officer
MEMORANDUM

From: HSLWM
To: HSLWM

For Information

Subject: Operation Close Encounter

The following HSLWM Details are provided in response to Ref A:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Equipment/Manpower</th>
<th>Hours Accrued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Manpower - Radiating</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Manpower (Warehouse and Fuel Farm)</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment (Sweeper)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment - Meals Consumed</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Manpower - Nurses</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total HSLWM Manhours Accrued 1334

Marine

Manpower

Equipment 1 craft on 08/04

Total 1964
MEMORANDUM

From: 2OCU

To: HQWLM

File: 2/3/AIR 1

Date: 20JUL83

Attention: XO

For Information: 77SQN

Subject: EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER - OVERTIME ACCRUED

1. As directed by OC, the following overtime data is provided for duty associated with Exercise Close Encounter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Type</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircrews (2OCU instructional staff)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Officer</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Aeremen</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Unit: 758 hours

2. The overtime hours above cover 2OCU personnel and exclude 77SQN aircrews who worked standby shifts over the weekend 2/3JUL83.

3. Apart from four sorties of tactical intercepts (staff continuation training) flown at the end of alert periods before the start of the normal flying day on 15JUL83, no flying was achieved as a result of the exercise alert. Indeed, the requirement to maintain alert states through Friday 15JUL83 forced the cancellation of six sorties of staff continuation training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>2OCU</th>
<th>77SQN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4x5</td>
<td>5x5</td>
<td>7x5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4x4</td>
<td>6x5</td>
<td>2x6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature: M.B. NIXON

Name: M.B. NIXON

Rank: WGCDR

Appointment: CO 2OCU

Phone No.: 6770
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS of 01 JUL 83

1. The reference directed that elements of HQWL and HQAMB participate in investigation of unidentified high speed radar tracks reported by Sydney radar.

2. Request you provide full details of equipment/manpower resources committed and the manpower overtime hours accrued in meeting this task.

BT

SIRA

(Handwritten note: Not (foot))

(H200) AOC wants to know if Friday 29 July 83
IDJ IDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR
A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83
B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83
1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.
2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>ACTION TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>HQWLM</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>NFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQWLM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>650WLM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8515QN</td>
<td>4815QN</td>
<td>775QN</td>
<td>20 CU</td>
<td>4 FLT</td>
<td>35RU</td>
<td>260QN</td>
<td>AJWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCE DAVID

RECEIVED 9 JUL 83.

28 JUL 83
NNNNVZCZCOHA711 HH
00 RAYRWB
DE RAYROB 085 1850700
ZNY RRRRR
0 040656Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO RAYRWB/HQWL
INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB
BT
RESTRICTED
SIG ADA
410/COFS
FOR OCS
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 040615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.

2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT
IMMEDIATE

ZUN RRRR

O R 040520Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO RAYBBB/HQAMB
RAYRWB/HQWLM
INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA
BT

RESTRICTED
SIG ADA
398/500PSB

FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.
OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTERS'

REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STrops of 4 JUL 83

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVEMENT IN OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTERS' NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS

BT
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

This message is a correction. Destroy other copies.

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPS/COFS OF 30 JUN 83

B. HQOC 073/SOINT OF 300350Z JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.
3. AIRCRAFT STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS ARE AT DISCRETION OF AOCOC, HOWEVER THE PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST OF THE TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE TO BE COVERED.

4. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED ON VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT, REPEAT, NOT TO CARRY WEAPONS.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO DEFAIR (DOPS-AF) ARE AS Follows:
   A. CURRENT AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS.
   B. ANY FURTHER DETECTIONS OF SIMILAR TRACKS AND DETAILS OF ANY RESPONSIVE ACTION ARE TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.
   C. A SITREP IS TO BE FORWARDED DAILY TO COVER THE SITUATION TO 1000 HOURS LOCAL. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS, ADVICE ON ANY PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF THE TRACKS AND ANY HQOC RECOMMENDATIONS.
   D. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OPERATION.

6. AT THIS STAGE IT IS PLANNED THAT AIRCRAFT STANDBY BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF ALL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS
NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMM/EN/SIGS use only

MESSAGE FORM

Department of Defence

NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM: HQM
TO: HQOC

INFO: DEFAIR CANZERRA

HQ AMB

HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DEOPS-AF, HQ AMB FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 3

DEFAIR AO917/DEOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83
8 HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2XNLR AND 1X F111 RELEASED FROM ALERT SIXTY
WEF 032200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL
RECOMMENCE, IF NECESSARY, AT 040500Z JUL 83.

2. 3 CRU REMAINS ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS, SURAD
AND FULL ATC SERVICES REMAIN ON CALL OUTSIDE
PROMULGATED OPERATING HOURS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD,
BUT NOT VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER CIVIL OR MILITARY
RADAR, ARE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>POSN</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0321</td>
<td>330 350 140</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600K</td>
<td>HELD FOR 6 SWEEPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGAL AUTHORITY:"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE INDICATORS</th>
<th>SIG/ORIG NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TIME** | **POIN** | **HDC** | **SPD** | **REMARKS**   
0639     | 250 SYD 135 | 170     |          | HELD BRIEFLY  
0703     | 352 SYD 145 | 170     |          | HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS 
0953     | 256 SYD 125 | S       | 400K    | BELIEVED WX INTERFERENCE  
1411     | 010 SYD 115 | S       |          | HELD UNTIL 1425, HEAVY WX IN AREA  
2310     | 010/140     | 180     |          | HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS  

4. IN VIEW OF THIS AND PREVIOUS SITREP, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND RETURN OF FILM TO AMB. IF FILM RESPONSE STILL CONSIDERED NECESSARY SUGGEST OC AMB BE TASKED TO PROVIDE ONE FILM ON ALERT 6D AT AMB BETWEEN 0800Z AND 2200Z DAILY.

---

**PAGE NO** | **DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE** | **PHONE NO** | **REF FILE NO** | **NO OF PAGES** | **RELEASEE'S NAME AND TITLE** | **SIGNATURE** | **DATE**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
2 | GIT-RT F. LOWERY TO HOWL | 6001 | 1720/411 | 2 | AS ABOVE | 

**FOR USE** | **DATE** | **TIME** | **SYSTEM** | **OPERATOR** | **D** | **DATE** | **TIME** | **SYSTEM** | **OPERATOR**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---

---

**Stock No 7530-66-094-6819**

---

**Security Classification**

**RESTRICTED**
IMMEDIATE

00 RAYRWB
DE RAYROB 422 1820407
ZNR UUUUU
0 010350Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO HQWLM
BT
UNCLAS
SIG ADA
387/COFS
FOR OC FROM COFS
SURVEILLANCE TASKING
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY
BT
Headquarters RAAF Williamtown Operation Order No 11/83 - Exercise Close Encounter

Reference: A. Telecon COFS/OCWLM of approximately 300930ZJUN83

Time Zone Used Throughout This Order: ZULU

Task Organization: No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 77 Squadron
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
No 481 Squadron
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown

1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.
   a. Energy Forces NIL
   b. Friendly Forces NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.
   a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.
   b. Provision of Forces.
      (1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.
      (2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77SQN pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.
      (3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.
      (4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.
      (5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77SQN or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.
3. Execution

a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DocA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.

b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.

c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.

d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1, and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.

e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCWLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.

f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENGO is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.

b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.

c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:

(1) ATC Van. The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.

(2) Refuelling Tankers. 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.

(3) Messing. All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.

(4) Central Store. Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.
5. **Command and Signal**
   
a. IFF/SIF. Routine 2OCU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.

6. **Acknowledgement Instructions.** Do not acknowledge.

---

**Distribution:**

- Headquarters RAAF Williamtown
- Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown
- No 77 Squadron
- No 481 Squadron
- No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
- No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
- Unit History
- HQWLM File 7/4/Air
- HQWLM File 16/27/Air
- Spares

**External:**

- Headquarters Operational Command

---

**Copy Nos:**

- 1-5
- 6-10
- 11-15
- 16-21
- 22-24
- 25-28
- 29-30
- 31
- 32
- 34-40

---

(W.D.J. McGAHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

---

RESTRICTED
651.

UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT SIGHTING

1. Since 6 Jun 83 a number of unidentified radar returns have been detected by Sydney ATC personnel. On each occasion the observed returns have been strong and the movement consistent with that of an aircraft. On only one occasion was 3CRU on the air. While 3CRU observed the return they were unable to obtain an altitude.

A brief summary of the contacts are as follows:

072230Z JUN 83 - CTC OVER COWRA TRACKING 090 DEGREES SPEED 1400 KTS
130638Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG 170 DEGREES
170940Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTL BETWEEN 90 AND 160 NMS NTH SYD
190836Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG STH. CTC LOST 130 NMS

191948Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 60 NMS NTH SYD HDG 360 DEGREES. CTC LOST 143 NMS

232243Z JUN 83 - A/C RETURN (FAST) OBSERVED 045 DEGREES M SYD BETWEEN 110 AND 150 NMS. HDG 045 DEGREES M SPEED APPROX 1500 KTS

ALL RETURNS WERE PRIMARY AIRCRAFT PAINTS.

2. THE SOURCE OF THE RETURNS ARE UNKNOWN. D OF A RADAR TECH STAFF ARE OF THE OPINION THAT ALL RETURNS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY FROM MAN MADE OBJECT.

3. THE SIGHTINGS HAVE OCCURRED ON AN IRREGULAR BASIS AND WITH ONE EXCEPTION EITHER EARLY MORNING OR EVENING.

4. 3 CRU IS REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN INVESTIGATING THESE UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS THROUGH INCREASED OPERATING TIME, IN PARTICULAR DURING HIGH PROB PERIODS OF EARLY MORNING AND EVENING, AND BY CLOSE COORDINATION WITH SYD RAAF-SECTOR EIGHT, SMACO.

5. 3 CRU IS ASKED TO ADVISE HQOC (ATTN-SOCC) OF ABILITY TO ASSIST OR ANY LIMITATIONS. THE DURATION OF INCREASED ACTIVITY REQUIRED WILL BE ADVISED, PENDING DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFAIR BT
OJ

O0 RAYRWB 00
DE RAYROB 085 1850700
ZNY RRRRR
O 049656Z JUL 83
RM HQOC
TO RAYRWB/HQWLM
INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB
BT
REstricted
SIG ADA
410/COFS
FôR OCR

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 049615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.

2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT
UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOP5-AF OF 1 JUL 83

B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83

1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.

2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B.
DE RAYROB 949 1850517
ZNY RRRRR
O R 040520Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO RAYBBB/HQAMB
RAYRWB/HQWLM
INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA
BT
RESTRICTED
SIG ADA
398/500PSB
FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS
REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STROPS OF 4JUL83
1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVEMENT IN OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDEPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS
BT
PAGE 2 RAYROB 930 R E S T R I C T E D

MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE REPORTED CONTACTS WERE AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE IN VIEW OF ABOVE STRONGLY RECOMMEND REVERSION TO NORMAL OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>File</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3CRs</td>
<td>85/59/1Air</td>
<td>04Jul83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To: HQWLM

Attention: OC KO

For Information

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. Please find enclosed at Annex A a summary of operational information of Operation Close Encounter for the last 24 hours.

Annex: A. Summary of Operational Information

Signature: [Signature]
Name: K.A. Keenan
Rank: Senior
Appointment: 770D
Phone No.: 608
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME(z)</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/SVD/RAE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0321</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>330/140</td>
<td>120°</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>EST HIG</td>
<td>CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12 MILES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO SPD/HT GIVEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0643</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>350/135</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0703</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>352/148</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BELEIVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. NS8CRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0953</td>
<td>WLM/APP</td>
<td>001/112</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td></td>
<td>M1.56</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAD. PLOTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(304km/40)</td>
<td>M2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ABOUT 15 MILES SE OF SYD CONTACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AT SAME TIME. HEAVY WX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 CONTACTS ONLY. NS8CRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CLASSIFIED AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3CRU</td>
<td>352/102</td>
<td>180°</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>ON TO SYD. LINES UP WITH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(310km/40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1411</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>010/115</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HELD UNTIL FADED OVER WLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AT 1425. NS3CRU. HEAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WEATHER IN AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2310</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>010/140</td>
<td>180°</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NS3CRU NS8URAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SIGHTINGS REPORTED FROM

SYDNEY ATC RADAR, MASCOT AIRPORT

FROM: 0001Z 03 JUL 83 TO: 2359Z 03 JULY 83
NOTE: Write only one addressee per line

FROM: HQWM
TO: HQOC

DEFAIR CANBERRA

HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR D5075-AF

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A HQWM 001/X0 OF 010050Z JUL 93

1. ACF A STATED THAT ROUTINE WM TRAINING/TASKS WILL SUFFER IF CURRENT ALERT STATES CONTINUE. ASSUMING REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT RESPONSE, BEST COMPROMISE IS TO PROVIDE 2X MIR PLUS 1X FILL ON ALERT 60. THIS WOULD OBLIGATE NEED TO ROTATE ALL WM CREWS THROUGH ALERT TWO AND COULD BE MET FROM CREWS ACCOMMODATED ON BASE. ROUTINE 2OCU AND 17 SQN TRAINING WOULD BE LARGELY UNAFFECTED AND SCRUT WM ATE COULD RESTRUCTURE ROSTERS TO ADVANTAGE.

2. YOUR EARLIEST RESPONSE TO THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.
ZNY RRRRR
0 R 030511Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO RAYUPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA
RAYRWB/HQWLM
INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB
BT
RESTRICTED
SIG ADA
726/COFS
DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, WLM FOR OC
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER
A. WLM 031/DO 030500Z SITREP NO 2.
B. HQOC 725/COFS 023411Z
1. REF A FURTHER SUBSTANTIATES OBSERVATIONS MADE IN SITREP NO 1
AND REF B THAT UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS ARE RESULT OF ELECTRONIC
PHENOMENON EXCLUSIVE TO SYDNEY ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. CLOSE
CONTACT WITH RADAR TECHS BEING MAINTAINED BUT AS YET NO CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED
2. IN VIEW COMMENTS PARA 5 REF A. STRONGLY RECOMMEND RESPONSE BE
SCALED DOWN TO LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING NORMAL TASKS.

PAGE 2 RAYROB 883 RESTRICTED

3. FOR HQWLM. IF ALERT STATE WITHDRAWN ADVISE WHAT RESPONSE COULD
BE GUARANTEED. ATC SURAD MAY NOW REVERT TO NORMAL OPERATIONS.
3CRY SURVEILLANCE TO CONTINUE ON 24 HOUR BASIS
BT
FOR AOCOC FROM OCWLM, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 2.

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83

B. HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X F111 RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND ALERT THIRTY RESPECTIVELY WEF 022200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL RECOMMENCE AT 030800Z JUL 83.

2. 3CRU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD ARE:

   TIME  POSN  HDG  SPD  REMARKS

   0230  005 SYD 100  N  FAST  HELD BRIEFLY
4. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND RAAF PERSONNEL AT SYD AACC HAVE VERIFIED THAT THESE UNIDENTIFIED RETURNS ARE ALL GENERATED SOLEY BY SYD ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. NONE, REPEAT NONE, HAVE BEEN VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER RADAR UNIT, CIVIL OR MILITARY. THEREFORE I BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE RESULT OF SOME ELECTRONIC PHENOMENON EXCLUSIVE TO SYD RADAR AND NOT EVIDENCE OF SOME UNIDENTIFIED INTRUDER.

5. CONTINUED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WILL, I BELIEVE, SERVE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS CONCLUSION, AND CONTINUED AIRCRAFT ALERT WILL THEREFORE SERVE NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN PREJUDICE WLM CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE NORMAL, IMPORTANT TASKS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM CONCERNED THAT FULL ATC SERVICES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM MONDAY IF 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE IS SUSTAINED. THIS WILL PREJUDICE OCU

TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IF WEATHER DETERIORATES. THEREFORE I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SUSPEND AIRCRAFT ALERTS FORTHWITH AND CONTINUE PURELY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNTIL FINAL DECISION CAN BE GIVEN
MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Restrict

From: 3CW
File: 85/S9/Air
Date: 03 Jul 83

To: HQWLM
Attention: OC XO

For Information:

Subject: Operation Close Encounter

1. Please find enclosed a summary of operational information of Close Encounter from 1000 hrs (Local) 02 Jul 83 until 1000 hrs 03 Jul 83.

Annexes:
A. Statistical Details
B. Information from GCI Controllers at Maceot.

RECEIVED
4 JUL 1983
HQWLM

Signature: [Signature]
Name: K. A. KEENAN
Rank: Sec w/ R
Appointment: T/CO
Phone No.: 6158

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Restrict
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (Z) REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG/SVD/RAE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0230</td>
<td>005/100</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY S'D NOT SEEN BY 3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0320</td>
<td>336/124</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY S'D NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437</td>
<td>360/120</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7 WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRU ON PAPER HDG AND SPD WERE OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (± 200') NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437 1/2</td>
<td>005/135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7 NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0439</td>
<td>008/150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 GOOD PAINTS NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0608</td>
<td>005/137?</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 PAINT ONLY (ROSS RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONTACT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0609</td>
<td>008/158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630</td>
<td>003/90</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ N MILES NS3CRU OR WLM SURAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0636</td>
<td>005/112</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ N MILES NS3CRU OR WLM SURAB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

8th Jun 83

1st Jul 83

2nd Jul 83

LOCAL

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1000
INFORMATION FROM GCI CONTROLLERS AT MASCOT

1. A surveillance and control (GCI) team is now temporarily at Mascot ANCC and operating 24 hrs/day until otherwise directed.

2. Until certain civilian technical staff report for duty on Monday 04 Jul 83 some questions cannot be adequately or satisfactorily answered but preliminary enquiries reveal the following:

a. The sensitivity of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR) may have been significantly increased following maintenance work in early June. The upsurge of Ufo activity is coincidental.

b. Although most contacts reported by AR members have appeared to move in straight lines and almost radially relative to the RSR, some have appeared to make slight alterations of course. All such alterations, however, have been to starboard, or clockwise. When carefully plotted sweep by sweep on the radarscope there is an appearance of spiral movement suggestive of a certain type of radar interference.

c. There is a large overlap between the RSR
and Round Mountain radar, the midpoint being about 120 n miles north of Sydney, but there is no absolute cutoff for display purposes although both displays are presumably correlated. Sydney technical staff appear confident that none of the tracks in question have been generated by Round Mountain. All have been within coverage of Sydney RSE with a high proportion within the overlap.

d. Round Mountain contacts are computer-generated. Only when the target is determined to be an aircraft and nothing else will it be presented for display. Sydney RSE approximates more to a 'raw' video display and may therefore be more prone to show a variety of dubious information.

3. At this stage GCI controllers at Mascot are sceptical of the chances that the contacts in question are solid objects, either propelled or ballistic.

K.A. Keenan
(Sign Dr)
7/CO 3AW
This message is a suspected duplicate

RESTRICTED

83 JUL-3 3:17

RAAF COMM CN

RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983

HQWL M

FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STWFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-330 AND FADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY RADAR COVERAGE 150-165 NM

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEYRADIALS
C. While some tracks are have been reported as very strong paints, the majority are weak.

D. Period of sightings age reported to range from between one to eight sweeps at five rpm. Although there have been exceptions extending to 14 sweeps assuming same track.

D. Plots of reported tracks are not consistent with any known flight profiles of any man made object nor are observations consistent with any previously experienced external interference.

E. Majority of the reported sightings have been in locations within Round Mountain, WLM Surad and 3CRU radar coverage. DoFA and RAAF ATC staff confirm that no tracks have been confirmed by Round Mountain since unidentified tracks were first observed. WLM staff also confirm they also have not seen any specific tracks reported by Sydney as unidentified or any other evidence of unidentified tracks on WLM radar. Ref B indicated that one track had been corroborated by 3CRU. Further inquiries reveal that this resulted from a rather casual inquiry from Sydney relating to an observed track about the time of the initial unidentified sightings. While not detracting from the accuracy of the statement it does raise extreme doubts on whether this unrecorded interchange could
BE REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW.

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS.

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONTINUING.

BT
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO. 1

A. DEPAF 10917/1002S-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83
B. HQSC 724/AFC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X F-111 RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND ALERT THIRTY RESPECTIVELY WEF 012359Z JUL 83. AIRCRAFT WILL RESUME ABOVE ALERT STATES AT 020600Z JUL 83.

2. SCBU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD WERE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME(2)</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0605</td>
<td>HELD 12 SECs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805</td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0905</td>
<td>HELD 2 SWEEPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stock No 7530660940819
NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMM/CEN/SIGS use only.
MEMORANDUM

From: 3CM

To: HQWM

Subject: OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

1. Please find enclosed operational details of CLOSE ENCOUNTER from commencement to 1700 hrs local 02Jul83.

Annex: A. 2 Copies of operational details from commencement until 1700 hrs 02Jul83.

Signature

K.T. Keenan

Name K.T. Keenan

Rank Sergeant

Appointment 7/CO

Phone No. 6158
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Reported By</th>
<th>FL/RANGE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/7/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 125</td>
<td>355 WUM 50</td>
<td>050</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 105</td>
<td>275 WUM 105</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 130</td>
<td>340 WUM 130</td>
<td>070</td>
<td>SLOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 120</td>
<td>115 WUM 120</td>
<td>070</td>
<td>SLOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 155</td>
<td>335 WUM 155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 155</td>
<td>335 WUM 155</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 72</td>
<td>270 WUM 72</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 135</td>
<td>355 WUM 65</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 120</td>
<td>360 WUM 120</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/8/83</td>
<td>SYD</td>
<td>005 SYD 135</td>
<td>355 WUM 65</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>FAST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEX A TO**

**300/83/59/MR**

**DATED 02 JUL 83**

**NOTES**

1. FAST INDICATES NOT BELOW 600 KNOTS. SOME SPEEDS APPEAR TO BE IN EXCESS OF 1000 KTS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (Z)</th>
<th>REPORTED BY</th>
<th>BRG / SYD / RAE</th>
<th>HDG</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0230</td>
<td>Sect P</td>
<td>005/100</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FAST</td>
<td></td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0320</td>
<td></td>
<td>336/124</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437</td>
<td>Sect 006.7</td>
<td>360/120</td>
<td>020</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7; WHEN PLOTTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BY 300 ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0437.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>005/135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OUT AT 040 1050 KTS (+200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0439</td>
<td></td>
<td>008/150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NS3CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0608</td>
<td></td>
<td>005/137</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3 CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0609</td>
<td></td>
<td>008/158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

By: 300

HDG AND SPD WARKS

OUT AT 040 1050 KTS (+200)

NS3 CRU

13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3 CRU
**NOTE:** Shaded areas are for COMM/JEN/SIGS use only.

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

**RESTRICTED**

---

**MESSAGE FORM**

**DATE:** 83 JUL 83

**TIME:** 12:21

**SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

**RESTRICTED**

---

**PRECEDENCE - ACTION**

**PRIORITY**

---

**ROUTING INDICATORS**

- Note: Write only one address in the FROM box.

**FROM:** HQAM

**TO:** HQOPS

---

**MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS**

**INFO DEFAIR**

- FOR COF HQRC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC

---

**OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER**

A HQOC 587/COFS of 01 JUL 83

B DEFAIR A/917/DGOPS-AF of 010514Z JUL 83

C HQOC 724/OC of 010755Z JUL 83

---

1. Requirements of Refs A & B are being implemented.

Two F-111 aircraft have arrived and crews are briefed. However, crews are out of duty time and have been stood down.

One F-111 will be on Alert Thirty, with 012000Z JUL 83.

Meanwhile, two Mirage IIIs are on Alert Twenty Four Hour Standby.

---

2. In light of para 2 Ref C, a review of all available records of contacts by ANG indicate no contacts any day between 2359Z and 0001Z.

Therefore, one shift of aircraft will be on Alert Twenty Four Hour Operation but at reduced manning during Alert Standby.

---

**NOTE:**

- Use only.

---

**FILE NO**

---

**DATE**

---

**REF FILE NO**

---

**DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**

---

**PHONE NO**

---

**FOR OPS USE**

R

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**REFERENCE**

---

**SIGNATURE**

---

**PAGE NO**

---

**NO OF PAGES**

---

**DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**

---

**PHONE NO**

---

**FOR OPS USE**

R

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**REFERENCE**

---

**SIGNATURE**

---

**PAGE NO**

---

**NO OF PAGES**

---

**DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**

---

**PHONE NO**

---

**FOR OPS USE**

R

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**REFERENCE**

---

**SIGNATURE**

---

**PAGE NO**

---

**NO OF PAGES**

---

**DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**

---

**PHONE NO**

---

**FOR OPS USE**

R

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**REFERENCE**

---

**SIGNATURE**

---

**PAGE NO**

---

**NO OF PAGES**

---

**DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE**

---

**PHONE NO**

---

**FOR OPS USE**

R

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**DATE**

---

**SYSTEM OPERATOR**

---

**REFERENCE**

---

**SIGNATURE**

---
3. Regarding para 5 Ref C, one RAAF SCI controller cannot adequately cover proposed period of aircraft operations. The SQRU has discussed relief manning proposals with TOLY/SCIWU who has nominated FLFL SNOW as qualified, current and available. Request OAMG consider relief and OAG action to attach SNOW to SQRU for duty RACC Maxot 06W 02JAN83. SNOW to report to SQ/CR NIEBERT.

4. Reports will be forwarded as directed Ref B.
FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STAFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-830 AND FAADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY RADAR COVERAGE 150-165 NM

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEY RADIALS
C. While some tracks are have been reported as very strong paints
the majority are weak
D. Period of sightings are reported to range from between one to
eight sweeps at five RPM. Although there have been exceptions
extending to 14 sweeps assuming same track
D. Plots of reported tracks are not consistent with any known flight
profiles of any man made object nor are observations consistent with
any previously experienced external interference
E. Majority of the reported sightings have been in locations
within Round Mountain, WLM Surad and 3CRU radar coverage. DOFA and
RAAF ATC staff confirm that no tracks have been confirmed by Round
Mountain since unidentified tracks were first observed. WLM
staff also confirm they also have not seen any specific tracks
reported by Sydney as unidentified or any other evidence of
unidentified tracks on WLM radar. REF B indicated that one track
had been corroborated by 3CRU. Further inquiries reveal that this
resulted from a rather casual inquiry from Sydney relating to an
observed track about the time of the initial unidentified sightings.
While not detracting from the accuracy of the statement it does
raise extreme doubts on whether this unrecorded interchange could
REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONTINUING

BT
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY

BT
RAF COMM

DE RAYROB 423 1820416
ZNR UUUUU
0 01042Z JUL 83
FM HQOC
TO RAYRCX/AVAIT NSW 022617Q
RAYRWB/HQWLM
BT
UNCLAS
SIG HOQ
397/SOCC
AVAIT FOR MR BOB POWELL (SSATC)
POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS WITHIN
150 NM RADIUS OF WILLIAMTOWN
A. TELCOM WGC DR V. MEYN/BOB POWELL.
1. TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE SCRAMBLE OF MIRAGE AIRCRAFT FROM WILLIAM-
TOWN, TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS, REQUEST ASSURANCE
THAT EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY SYDNEY AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL, TO PERMIT UNINTERRUPTED SCRAMBLE VECTORS AS
REQUESTED BY WILLIAMTOWN.
2. THE DURATION OF THIS REQUEST IS UNKNOWN, AND APPLICATION OF
OF THIS ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED UNTIL OTHERWISE ADVISED BY HQ
WILLIAMTOWN

PAGE 2 RAYROB 423 UNCLAS
3. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE TO THIS HQ AND HQWLM
BT
UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPSAF/COFS OF 30 JUN 83
B. HQOC 073/JOINT OF 300350Z JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.
ARterial standby arrangements are at discretion of AOCOC, however the periods during which most of the tracks have occurred are to be covered.

4. Aircraft employed on visual identification flights are not, repeat, not to carry weapons.

5. Reporting requirements to Defair (DOPS-AF) are as follows:
   A. current aircraft/cru standby status.
   B. any further detections of similar tracks and details of any responsive action are to be reported immediately.
   C. A sitrep is to be forwarded daily to cover the situation to 1000 hours local. This should include any significant changes to aircraft/cru standby status, advice on any progress made in establishing the cause of the tracks and any HQOC recommendations.
   D. A final report will be required at the conclusion of the operation.

6. at this stage it is planned that aircraft standby be continued for at least one week. however, this aspect will be kept under review in the light of the results of all investigations into the unidentified tracks
FOR OCAMB, OCWLM DEFAIR FOR DGOPS
OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

1. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYD AREA.

2. OCWLM HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO IDENTIFY THESE TRACKS. TO SUPPORT OCWLM AS NECESSARY YOU ARE TO DEPLOY TWO CLEAN F111S TO WLM ASAP. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE ASSETS IS TO REVERT TO OCWLM ON ARRIVAL WLM.
3. AT THIS STAGE, THESE AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE OPERATED ON AN AIRCREW TURNAROUND BASIS UNTIL TUES 5 JUL 83, WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM HQWLM UNITS. UP TO TWO MISSIONS PER DAY SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED. FURTHER AIRCREW/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT EX AMBERLEY MAY BE REQUIRED AFTER MON 4 JUL 83. DIRLAUTH OCWLM/OCAMB IS AUTHORIZED IN THIS REGARD.

4. SEPERATE INSTRUCTIONS/GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF F111 ASSETS IN THIS OPERATION WILL BE ISSUED TO OCWLM INFO OCAMB.
FURTHER TO INSTRUCTIONS AT REFERENCE A AND CONSIDERING THE REQUIREMENTS OF REFERENCE B, AIRCRAFT MAY BE SCRAMBLED, AT YOUR DISCRETION, FOR IDENTIFICATION OF TRACKS DETECTED ONLY BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. AIRCRAFT AND CARU ALERT STATES ARE AT YOUR DISCRETION, HOWEVER, YOU ARE TO ENSURE THAT TIME PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED.
2. Two F-111 aircraft are being deployed to WLM for your use during this operation and are placed under your operational control from time of arrival WLM.

4. For the purposes of this operation the restrictions regarding supersonic flight as detailed in HQOC ASI 1/A/4 are waived. However, F-111 aircraft should avoid supersonic flight over land unless it becomes essential for the successful identification of a target.

5. One air defence controller has been attached from 3 CARU for duty at Mascot. On his arrival at Mascot close control of aircraft could be effected, at your discretion, by either 3 CARU or Sydney radar.

6. Special airways clearance arrangements have been agreed with DOA Sydney and details have been advised separately.

7. You are to report direct to this HQ copy to DEFAIR (DGOPS) as required by Para 5 of Reference B. Details of scrambles and advice of any multi sensor correlated tracks should be dispatched immediately. The daily SITREP should include details of all unidentified tracks reported to 3 CARU.

BT
1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.

   a. Energy Forces         NIL
   b. Friendly Forces        NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.

   a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.
   b. Provision of Forces.

   (1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77Sqn are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.

   (2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77Sqn are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77Sqn pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.

   (3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.

   (4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.

   (5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77Sqn or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.
3. Execution

a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DoA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.

b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.

c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.

d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1 and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.

e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.

f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENGO is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.

b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.

c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:

   (1) **ATC Van.** The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.

   (2) **Refuelling Tankers.** 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.

   (3) **Messing.** All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.

   (4) **Central Store.** Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.
5. Command and Signal
   a. IFF/SIF. Routine 2OCU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.

6. Acknowledgement Instructions. Do not acknowledge.

Distribution:

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown
No 77 Squadron
No 481 Squadron
No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
Unit History
HQWLM File 7/4/Air
HQWLM File 46/27/Air
Spares

External:

Headquarters Operational Command

Copy Nos:

1-5
6-10
11-15
16-21
22-24
25-28
29-30
31
32
34-40
33

(W.D.J. MCMANAGHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding